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THE MANDATE FOR A NEW EQUAL
PROTECTION MODEL
Justice Jackson articulated the importance of the equal protection clause
in the clearest terms when he stated,
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget
today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door
to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick
and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus
to escape the politial retribution that might be visited upon them
if larger numbers were affected.1
Yet, despite the apparent simplicity of the concept, the Supreme Court has
been vexed in trying to find a suitable model of general application.
I. HISTORICAL VIEW
In the Reconstruction era the narrowest of all possible positions was taken
by the Supreme Court in deciding the Slaughter-House Cases.2  The four-
teenth amendment's express provision guaranteeing "to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" was given the gloss of his-
torical circumstance to arrive at the conclusion that it was only to be applied
to cases involving racial discrimination. 4
One of the Supreme Court's most significant breaks with this narrow con-
struction occurred in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson5 where Justice
1. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
2. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Slaughter-House Cases involved an exclusive
franchise granted by the state of Louisiana to operate slaughter-houses in the New Or-
leans area. The franchise was upheld as part of the state's police power despite chal-
lenges under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. The Court chose to view both
amendments as applicable only to suppression of the Negro race.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71. The Court stated:
[I]n the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called
history ...no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found in them all [the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments], lying
at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been
even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race . . ..
5. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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Douglas, writing for the majority, perceived the right to procreation as trigger-
ing the "strict scrutiny"" of the Court. However, it was not until the Warren
Court that the first true model for equal protection analysis emerged. It was
in such cases as Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,7 Loving v. Virginia,8
and Shapiro v. Thompson9 that the Warren Court articulated a two-tier
model for the analysis of equal protection cases. On tier one, the Court chose
to defer almost entirely to legislative prerogative in its application of the "ra-
tional relationship" standard. 10 The test was whether the legislation (the
means) was rationally related to any possible legislative goal (the ends).
This "any conceivable basis" test was easily met for it was only the purely
arbitrary legislative enactment that could not be rationally connected with
at least some legitimate goal. However, if a "fundamental right" or "suspect
classification" were found, then the Court would apply "strict scrutiny" to the
legislative enactment." In practice, with only one exception through the end
of the Warren Court era,12 this second standard of review proved fatal to
the legislation. The rigidity of this model made the Court reluctant to ex-
pand the scope of fundamental interests' 3 or suspect classifications,'14 for that
6. Id. at 541. Justice Douglas drew an analogy to the discrimination against
Chinese aliens desiring to enter the laundry business in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 369 (1886), and Negro college students desiring to enter law school in Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). Of course, in view of subsequent devel-
opments in this area, the distinction can be made that Yick Wo and Gaines involved
suspect classifications, while Skinner was uniquely a fundamental interest case.
7. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (fundamental right to vote invokes strict scrutiny).
8. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race remains a suspect classification invoking strict scrutiny).
9. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (fundamental right to travel invokes strict scrutiny).
10. "The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. . . . A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (emphasis added).
This judicial construction of the tier one equal protection standard was followed in
a long line of cases where great deference was given to the legislature's prerogative. The
"rational basis" test has been most uniformly applied in the area of economic regulation.
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Tigner v. Texas, 310
U.S. 141 (1940). But cf. Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). However,
it is the application of this test to social legislation by both the Warren and Burger
Courts that has appeared the most arbitrary. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children payments not violative of equal pro-
tection); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (tenant eviction regulations upheld);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (AFDC ceiling upheld); McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (restriction of pretrial detainees' right
to vote upheld).
11. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAiv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
12. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (order excluding all
persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast during World War II upheld).
13. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education
is not a right grounded in the Constitution and therefore not fundamental); Jefferson
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would severely restrain the legislature in enacting laws affecting those areas.
The end result was a small patchwork of highly protected classes' 5 and
rights' 6 with virtually no judicial protection for many other apparently de-
serving areas.
II. THE BURGER COURT TAKES A FEW CAUTIOUS STEPS FORWARD
Although unwilling to expand the coverage of the Warren Court's strictly
applied tier two, the Burger Court has clearly been far more interventionist
than many would have predicted. Legislative enactments have been struck
down in a variety of circumstances which would have likely gone unpro-
tected or at least unanswered by the Warren Court model.17 Several com-
mentators have noted this trend' 8 and Professor Gunther, in his now famous
article,' 9 even attempted to fit the first group of these cases within a tough-
ened tier one analysis. However, the difficulty has been that the Court has
begun its new analysis with what Professor Shapiro would term an "incremen-
talist" approach.20  Instead of delineating a new model in a landmark case,
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (no fundamental right to receive welfare benefits);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (party's interest in retaining housing unit is not
a fundamental right).
14. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex not suspect classifica-
tion); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth not
suspect classification).
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Rodriguez, reversed the district court's find-
ing that local financing of public schools must be given strict scrutiny because it discrim-
inated on the basis of wealth. Although finding that no identifiable class of "poor"
existed on the facts of the case, Justice Powell went on to reiterate that the Court has
never held a wealth classification to be suspect. Id. at 29.
15. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (race).
16. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (criminal appeals).
17. See pp. 575-77 infra.
18. See Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral and Permissive Classifications, 62 GFO. L.J. 1071
(1974); Note, A Question of Balance: Statutory Classifications Under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REV. 155 (1973); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and
Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
19. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HA.v. L.
REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
20. Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: Incrementalism or
Stare Decisis, 2 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. 134 (1965). Incrementalism is a term used to
describe the slow evolution of a particular rule of law through the process of limited
judicial decisionmaking upon a variety of fact patterns. This type of legal process, of
course, has been followed most often under the common law system. The direct oppo-
[Vol. 24:558
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the Court appears still in search of a model while at the same time unwilling
to let certain cases pass without attention. The result is a variety of language
which defies categorization, and a definite trend toward a more independent
role for the Court in some unique new areas. 21 Apparently the Court is no
longer willing to view deferentially all classifications which fall nominally
within the Warren Court's tier one (rational relationship) area.
This Comment, in accepting the proposition of Professor Snortland that
"mixed-scanning" most accurately describes judicial decisionmaking, 22 will
attempt to illustrate that the Court must now either adopt a new model for
dealing with equal protection issues or seriously impair its own judicial in-
tegrity in this area.23  After having substantiated the need for a new ap-
proach, one such model will be suggested.
III. RATIONAL BASIS TEST AS THE DEFECTIVE FORM OF ANALYSIS
The Court's apparent aversion to the use of strict scrutiny terminology, ex-
cept within already defined categories, has led it to rely on the "rational
basis" language of previous opinions24 in striking down legislative enactments
in several new areas. Although these cases appear to involve near suspect
classes or possibly fundamental rights, acknowledgement of that fact is gen-
erally to be found only in concurring or dissenting opinions. 25  It was this
lack of judicial candor in several majority opinions that led Professor Gun-
ther to postulate that the Court was adopting a new middle -tier where
"means-focused" scrutiny would apply. 26 The new test he proposed would
site occurs where the court itself issues general code type decrees as has been the case
more often under the civil law systems.
21. See Gunther 33-37.
22. Snortland & Stanga, Neutral Principles and Decision-Making Theory: An Al-
ternative to Incrementalism, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1006 (1973). Professor Snortland
uses the term "mixed-scanning" to describe the process whereby courts will deal on an
ad hoe basis with a series of cases in a particular area before attempting to promulgate
a rule of more general application.
23. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1959) (asserting that judicial integrity is evidenced in the reasoning judges use
in reaching their decisions).
24. See note 10 supra.
25. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (classification in question affects fundamental right of free-
dom to associate and therefore should be accorded strict scrutiny).
26. Gunther 20-24. The term "means-focused" scrutiny is used by Professor Gunther
as a shorthand expression for the Court's requiring that the legislation substantially fur-
ther a legislative end. Thus the over-inclusiveness or under-inclusiveness of a classifica-
tion would be more closely examined (even on tier one) and the Court would be more
likely to examine the factual support for it before finding a rational relationship between
means and ends. While not suggesting judicial intervention as to the choice of legisla-
19751
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require the Court to closely examine the legislative means (the act itself)
to determine if it substantially furthered an articulated legislative end (the
act's purpose). The initial difficulty with this position has been demon-
strated in subsequent equal protection decisions in which the Court has also
applied increasing scrutiny to legislative ends without concern for their rela-
tionship to the means. 2 7
Perhaps more significantly, the Court has in the past exhibited the power
to manipulate the rational basis (means/end) test to create almost any
desired result.2s This manipulative power has led one critic to conclude that
the rationality test is "an empty requirement and a misleading analytic de-
vice."'29  By simply redefining a classification, the Court can make it appear
either over-inclusive or under-inclusive. Conversely, the Court has also
shown that by its definition of the legislative purpose or end, an enact-
ment can be made to stand or fall.30  Under the Warren Court's tier one, it
tive goals, the Court would hold the legislature to a closer standard when picking the
means of effecting those goals. The means themselves would be given the new and
closer scrutiny, hence the term "means-focused" scrutiny.
27. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
The Court there found the shallowly veiled goal of excluding "hippies" from the food
stamp program unacceptable and a violation of the equal protection clause. There was
no question raised as to the legislation's effectiveness in carrying out such a goal. In
fact, if anything, the means chosen were too clearly related to the act's purpose. In
Moreno, it was the end itself that was seen as violating the fourteenth amendment.
Compare id. with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which was decided under the due
process clause, but where the Court also overtly examined the legislative end.
28. The use of means/ends analysis as an avoidance technique is admitted even by
its strongest advocate, Professor Gunther. See Gunther 30. Professor Gunther cited
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), as
examples where the Court avoided tackling overtly the suspect qualities of a sex classifi.
cation and the fundamental nature of the right to privacy by selective use of the rational
basis test.
29. Yale Note, supra note 18, at 128.
30. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The plurality opinion identi-
fied three goals of the legislation: 1) the restriction of pre-marital sex; 2) better public
health; and 3) the banning of an inherently immoral practice. The problem with goals
two and three were their excessive generality. Better health was certainly a legitimate
goal, but it was hard to say, when married people were allowed contraceptives, that the
same contraceptives were inherently unhealthy for single people. Similarly, if contra-
ception was per se immoral, why allow the practice among married persons? However,
as to goal one, the Court had set up less of a strawman and was forced to more closely
evaluate whether narrower alternative means to restrict pre-marital sex were available.
The Court pointed out that pre-marital sex was criminally punishable in that jurisdiction,
and that such provision represented a more precisely drawn means of attaining this goal
than the statute under attack. It was at this point that the majority opinion came closest
to tier two analysis, where the narrowness of the goal is of particular significance in
determining if the means is "necessary," as opposed to being "merely rationally related"
to fulfilling a "compelling state interest." See 405 U.S. at 447 n.7.
If, on the other hand, the Court truly had been interested in judicial deference, it
[Vol. 24:558
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is simply up to the Court to define the level of abstraction which it wishes
to assign the statute's goal and thereby preordain whether the act will be
seen as logically in furtherance of the chosen goal or not."'
To avoid this pattern of judicial manipulation it would be necessary to
somehow limit the Court's discretion in picking the legislative purpose. One
suggestion would be to examine the goal of each enactment as reflected in
the legislative process itself. Of course, it must be noted initially that there
exists the possibility of multiple legislative goals. However, granted that dif-
ficulty is recognized and accepted, several more serious problems remain.
First, one is faced with the practical difficulty that the legislative history of
an act generally only gives the most vague impression of the actual reasons
the particular act was favored by a majority of legislators on a given day.
The legislature by its very nature embodies in any one act a multitude of
separate decisions, each of which is premised upon such a variety of often
unarticulated rationales, compromises, and ideas as to be incapable of precise
ascertainment. To presume that a legislature acts with singlemindedness on
even the most pressing legislation, not to mention an obscure provision of a
particular servicemen's benfits bill,82 or of a food stamp bill,88 defies modem
political analysis.34 Though Professor Gunther has suggested this might all
change if legislatures knew that in the future courts would test various enact-
ments against articulated legislative goals,8 5 it seems the more likely legisla-
could have picked a reasonable goal for the legislation at the outset. For example, the
Court could have chosen the narrower goal of providing medical supervision of the dis-
tribution of contraceptives to the extent that this would not increase the availability of
contraceptives to the unmarried. See Yale Note, supra note 18, at 127.
31. A good discussion of the Court's use of this technique appears in the Yale Note,
supra note 18, at 137-38. In contrast, a balancing model would force the Court to evalu-
ate openly the significance of an overly general goal, and correspondingly reduce its rele-
vance. See p. 564 inIra.
32. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The statute at issue provided
as a matter of administrative convenience that a serviceman was automatically entitled
to dependency benefits when married, whereas a servicewoman would be forced to prove
she provided over half of her husband's support before being given similar benefits.
33. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). The
statute at issue excluded from participation in the food stamp program those households
containing an individual unrelated to the claimant.
34. For a general discussion of legislative decisionmaking, see J. KINODON, CON-
GRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (1973). Also, a detailed analysis of the legislative
history of the food stamp programs is provided in N. KoTZ, LET THEM EAT PROMISES;
TiIE POLITICS OF HUNGER IN AMERICA (1969).
35. If the Court were to require an articulation of purpose from an authoritative
state source, rather than hypothesizing one on its own, there would at least be
indirect pressure on the legislature to state its own reasons for selecting particu-
lar means and classifications. And that pressure would further the political
process aims of the moderate intervention model.
Gunther 47.
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tive reaction simply would be to preface every bill with a statement of pur-
pose, as is frequently done already. The difficulty with such a procedure
is that -the statements of purpose would themselves be subject to the same
tradeoffs that created the original bill. In fact, rather than the legislature
defining narrow, meaningful goals that the courts could best work with, the
response would more likely be the drafting of the most universally laudable
and general goals possible in order for the bill's proponents to garner the
broadest support for the measure.
As a second possible alternative to the judicial goal postulation inherent
in the Warren Court's formulation of the rational basis test, Professor Gun-
ther has suggested that the court be satisfied with examining the legislative
purposes adopted either by the state courts or the state attorney general's of-
fice.36 The difficulty, of course, with state court opinions as a source of legis-
lative intent is that they are simply not coextensive with the Supreme Court's
needs. Though often examined today in attempts to ascertain legislative pur-
pose, they deal only with a limited number of enactments, and, more funda-
mentally, serve only to push the task of examining the act's legislative history
back one step. Moreover, there is no assurance the state court has any
greater access to the applicable legislative material than the Supreme Court;
nor is there reason to believe the state court is any more qualified to
examine those materials than federal courts.
Professor Gunther's suggestion that the Court look to the attorney general's
description of the legislative purpose faces similar difficulties. If the attorney
general's office is to make an objective determination, then it too must look
to the legislative history with no more assurance of accuracy than the courts.
On the other hand, if the state attorney general's office is merely to
postulate a goal or several goals, the "any conceivable basis" test has simply
been reinstated, with the attorney general's office replacing the Court as the
party responsible for picking some conceivable basis for the legislation. 7
Surely the attorney general's response to the actual or potential litigant would
be to state the purpose as laudably and generally as possible and thereby
hope to aid in sustaining the legislative enactment.
Thus, given that the means/ends relationship test presupposes some ascer-
tainable ends against which to test the means, the Court is left in an unten-
able position. If the Court were to return to the pure "any conceivable
36. Gunther 46-47.
37. A good example of the extreme such rationales can take was Justice Harlan's con-
tention in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960), that Congress had denied
social security benefits to deported aliens for the laudable purpose of keeping all such
payments within the country and thus increasing domestic purchasing power.
[Vol. 24:558
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basis" standard as it did in Jefferson v. Hackney38 for all tier one cases, then
it is difficult to conceive of any legislative enactment which could be found
violative of the equal protection clause. On the other hand, if the Court
chose to adopt the toughened tier one model suggested by Professor Gun-
ther, it would be faced with the pragmatic goal identification difficulties dis-
cussed above. We are therefore left with a test which cannot be meaning-
fully applied because it presumes to evaluate a logical relationship which in
fact is not the basis of the constitutional infringement.
While the weight ultimately to be given a particular state interest may re-
flect an evaluation of the closeness of the causal connection between the act
itself and such a state interest, that is not to say that the constitutional valid-
ity of the legislation rests only on this relationship. If there is no real connec-
tion between the act and a suggested state interest, 'then that interest may
simply be irrelevant in terms of the issues raised by the legislation. Although
the Court may choose to pick a particular goal or group of goals for an act
so as to defy any causal relationship between those goals and the act, as it
did in Eisenstadt,39 that clearly is not the actual basis for finding a constitu-
tional violation. The Constitution speaks of "equal protection of the laws",
not protection against artificial caprice without harm. It is the actual harm
flowing from the legislative classification that raises the question of a constitu-
tional violation. The apparent arbitrariness of a particular legislative act
with respect to "legitimate" state goals simply serves to identify the possibility
that the legislature was actually acting as a result of an unarticulated, yet
invidiously discriminatory motive. It appears that because such a motive is
either too difficult or too controversial to overtly identify, the Court has
found it convenient to adopt the essentially artificial rational relationship
standard and thereby -test only the relationship between the act and any
"legitimate" goals the Court itself is willing to postulate. The result does not
necessarily comport with the constitutional standard because the actual harm
imposed by the classification has not been evaluated. The rational basis test
only determines whether the state is without a justification for the legislation
that the Court is willing to postulate. In fact, the purpose may be to directly
harm a particular group of individuals, as the Court found while undertaking
a rare example of judicial examination of legislative ends in United States De-
partment of Agriculture v. Moreno.40 Yet, fundamentally it is not the hoped
for benefit or harm of a particular legislative act or even the causal connec-
tion between the legislative purpose and the act itself, but rather the actual
38. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
39. See note 30 supra.
40. See note 27 supra.
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effect of the act that is potentially unconstitutional. Whether the legislature
is capricious in its reasoning or totally logical in its action is really not for
judicial inquiry, but rather it is for the Court to determine if a class of indi-
viduals has in fact been unconstitutionally harmed by the classification
drawn.
Further, the means/ends rational relationship -test is subject to an addi-
tional critical flaw. It does not reflect accurately even the Court's actual
decisionmaking process, which in fact more closely corresponds to the consti-
tutional standard outlined above. While the closeness of the tie between
means and ends may reflect a portion of the Court's analysis, it is in reality
not nearly as determinative as equal protection opinions would imply. Pro-
fessor Gunther makes this very admission when he praises the manipulative
aspects of the test as it now exists, and his suggested modification of it.41
Any artificial model which does not reflect the actual balancing type of deci-
sionmaking which the Court uses will eventually reveal its own inadequacies,
and thus only serve to discredit the judicial process in the end. Or, as an-
other writer has stated in evaluating the equal protection area:
Because the disputes that arise under the rubric of the Equal
Protection Clause have to do with the relative merits of competing
public policies, judicial decisions obscure the central issues in such
cases to the extent that they are based on discussions of a statute's
rationality. The nature of the conflict between the political values
at stake as well as the underlying basis of judicial reasoning would
be made more explicit if the competing public policies were
weighed outright without diversionary discussions regarding a stat-
ute's rationality. Of course, it is an open question how aggressively
the Equal Protection Clause should be used. But however actively
it is used in the future, the process of forthright constitutional ad-
judication would be well served if the courts would recognize that
discussion of a statute's rationality is a meaningless and confusing
exercise.42
IV. BALANCING: A PROPOSED APPLICATION OF THE OLD MODEL
TO THE "NEW" EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUES
The idea of balancing is not new to the area of equal protection
for it was an integral part of the Warren Court's tier two analysis. Ac-
cording to the Warren Court's language, the creation of a suspect classifica-
tion or the infringement of a fundamental right could only be justified if it
were necessary to the fulfillment of a "compelling state interest." Though in
41. Gunther 30.
42. Yale Note, supra note 18, at 154 (footnote omitted).
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reality the result under the Warren Court was that such a compelling state
interest did not exist, the framework was one of balancing, and the Court
regularly went through the balancing process before rendering a decision. 43
The Court, however, began with a fixed high value on one side of the scale
whenever a suspect class or fundamental right was established. Thus, in one
sense, it was an all or nothing test where the sole issue was whether the
state interest in question could be assigned compelling weight. Also, it should
be pointed out that inherent in any weighing was the assumption that a sub-
stantial relationship existed between the means of achieving the supposed
interest and the interest itself. The closeness of the tie between legislative
goal and legislative act was therefore only one of the factors to be evaluated
in the weighing process.44
The model proposed here to deal with all other equal protection cases will
in many respects follow the Warren Court's model for tier two analysis. In
general, it would require the overweighing of the potential benefit of the
legislation against the legislation's potential for harm (the relative "suspect-
ness" of the class or relative "fundamentalness" of the right infringed). Al-
though an unrestricted weighing of such factors is arguably a job better suited
43. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, balanced the state's police power against prison inmates' right to marriage and
procreation in determining Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act to be uncon-
stitutional. After discussing both the state's interest and the nature of the inmates'
rights, he chose to evaluate the statute under the strict scrutiny standard of Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
In the reapportionment case of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964), after
analogizing the right to vote to the right to procreate at issue in Skinner, the Court
stated, "Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area
alone provide an insufficient justification for deviations from the equal-population prin-
cipal." (emphasis added). Thus, after having evaluated the importance of state sover-
eignty and the logistical difficulties involved, and having discounted the historical prece-
dent of the federal system, the Court determined that the individual's right to vote was
paramount.
An even clearer example of overt judicial balancing in a tier two equal protection case
is Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), which dealt with an alien's right to re-
ceive welfare benefits. After analogizing the alien's position to that of other discrete
and insular minorities, the Court evaluated the state's "special public interest" in favor-
ing its own citizens. In summarizing the Court's position, Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, stated, "[W]e conclude that a State's desire to preserve limited welfare bene-
fits for its own citizens is inadequate to justify Pennsylvania's making noncitizens ineli-
gible for public assistance...." Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
Finally, the most often quoted formulation of the Warren Court's tier two test suggests
the same judicial weighing of the state interest. "[A]ny classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of [a constitutional] right, unless shown to be necessary to promote
a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969).
44. See pp. 574-76 infra.
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for the legislature, the confines of this model as amplified below could make
a balancing role for the Court in the tier one and mid-tier areas of equal
protection analysis as appropriate and meaningful as that role has been in
the area of procedural due process. 45
A. Suspectness
,In an abstract sense, all legislation classifies those benefited and those
harmed, at least in that particular taxpayers generally receive a more im-
mediate return than others. However, it has been suggested that certain clas-
sifications are more "suspect" than others. 46  By rooting the qualities of
suspectness in those characteristics common to the racial minority at which
the fourteenth amendment was originally, though not exclusively aimed, 47 the
Court can achieve both the congruity and flexibility needed for a new weigh-
ing model.
One writer has chosen to list the characteristics of suspectness as: 1) ap-
plication to a discrete and insular minority; 2) stigmatization of the affected
class; and 3) immutability of traits upon which the classification is based.48
By choosing to treat these characteristics as factors of suspectness, rather than
requirements of a suspect class, the writer suggested that a relative weight
45. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (professor with ten years of
seniority found to have sufficient "property" right in job to require hearing regarding
rehiring); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (professor hired for only one
year, without notice that he would not be rehired, found not to have sufficient "property"
interest in job to require hearing before regents decided against rehiring); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipients' interest in continuation of benefits found
to outweigh state interest in administrative efficiency, and pretermination hearing thus
required).
46. The standard for determining suspectness was outlined by Justice Stone as
"whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-
53 n.4 (1938). Compare id. with Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d
1028 (5th Cir. 1975), where the court, although indicating its receptivity to a relaxed
suspectness standard, refused to acknowledge such categories as "late achieving students"
and "student athletes." The court declined to strike down the NCAA's minimum grade
point average requirement for participation in intercollegiate athletic programs.
47. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954); Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873).
48. See Note, A Question of Balance: Statutory Classifications Under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REv. 155 (1973). Although this Note posits a second ques-
tion with respect to each characteristic, i.e., whether the legislation actually affects that
characteristic, the question appears simply redundant in terms of the model here sug-
gested. The very weighing of the statute's harm, discussed infra, will imply considera-
tion of the statute's actual impact on the class.
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could be given the harm caused by the classification. In cases where all
three characteristics are solidly present, as is the case, for example, with a
racial minority classification, then the harm is potentially the most over-
whelming and even a very significant state interest will not overcome it. This
would, of course, be particularly true where the state's interest is diminished
by the fact that alternative means are available to achieve the same goal.
Yet, in many classifications of recent interest to the Court, such as illegiti-
macy, 49 sex5° and poverty,5 it is not clear that all three characteristics are
present. 52  In such a case, if only two characteristics of suspectness were
present, or if two were clearly present and the third present only to a
limited degree, the Court should not be compelled to either strike down the
legislation or to uphold it as the Warren Court model would have dictated.
For example, if alienage were the classification, but the legislation involved
a citizenship requirement for civil service jobs, perhaps the classification
could stand or fall depending on the particular job's connection with national
defense. 53 Whereas the traditional Warren Court model would have required
initially an absolute decision as to whether a "suspect" class existed, the
model proposed here would allow suspectness to be evaluated on a sliding
scale. Then, if in a particular case the classification only rose to a nearly
suspect level, a second and third step would be required to complete the
analysis. The level of suspectness having been identified, the Court would
still have to ascertain the fundamentalness of any rights affected and to
evaluate the nature of the state interest, both in accord with specified stand-
ards, 154 before making a final determination of whether the classification was
constitutional. Only if such specified standards are applied can it be argued
,that a reasonably congruent framework of analysis is actually presented. If
the Court were left free to analyze suspectness, fundamentalness or the state's
interest without the self-restraint of specific guidelines, then the specter of
a judicial superlegislature reminiscent of the substantive due process era 55
would certainly be present.
49. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vin-
cent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
50. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971).
51. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973);
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
52. See Note, supra note 48, at 166-73.
53. The Court recently decided that in the area of nondefense state civil service jobs
such a requirement of citizenship is unconstitutional. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973).
54. See pp. 567-68 supra & pp. 570-73 infra.
55. See Finkelstein, From Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton: A Study in the Judi-
cial Process, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 769 (1927); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and
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B. Fundamentalness
Justice Marshall, dissenting in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,56 suggested,
Although not all fundamental interests are constitutionally guar-
anteed, the determination of which interests are fundamental
should be firmly rooted in the text of the Constitution. The task
in every case should be to determine the extent to which constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned
in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific constitu-
tional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the
nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the
degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on
a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly. 57
While this standard clearly reflects the Warren Court's previous criteria for
making a yes or no determination of whether a right was "fundamental", the
amplification Justice Marshall suggests is to evaluate the quality of funda-
mentalness along a spectrum. The Court would no longer have to make the
type of tortured analysis employed by Justice Powell in Rodriguez, where he
was forced by his own model to deny any substantial tie between the quality
of education and the right to vote,58 which had previously been deemed
the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34; Pound, Com-
mon Law and Legislation, 21 HAIv. L. REv. 383 (1908). See also Liggett Co. v. Bald-
ridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) (prohibition on new entry into pharmacy business by non-
pharmacists invalid as an unreasonable restriction upon private business); Tyson & Bros.
v. Barton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (price regulation of theatre ticket resales violates due
process); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (regulation of wages violates
due process); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (statute forbidding interstate
railroad to discharge employee for union membership infringes on employer's due proc-
ess rights); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (statute prohibiting employment
in bakery for more than sixty hours a week or ten hours a day violates due process).
56. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
57. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. In Rodriguez, Justice Powell opened his discussion of -why the right to education
cannot be deemed fundamental by quoting at length from Brown. Although he admitted
that the Brown decision substantiated the importance of public education in our "free
society," he contended that the test for determining whether a right is fundamental is not
its general importance but rather its tie to the Constitution either "explicitly or im-
plicitly." Id. at 30, 33. However, Justice Powell failed to answer why the right to
travel found fundamental in Shapiro is more "implicit" in the Constitution than the right
to an education. Id. at 31-32. Moreover, in citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972) (right to housing) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (right to
welfare benefits), Justice Powell made no attempt to distinguish those rights from the
right to travel. When he finally did address the question of why the right to education
is not "implicit" in the Constitution, despite appellees' arguments, he stated, "We need
not dispute any of these propositions [for showing the nexus between the right to educa-
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fundamental in Harper.59 Given Justice Marshall's suggestion, the majority
analysis might have openly admitted the fundamentalness of the right to edu-
cation due to its close tie to other fundamental rights,60 and thereby have
been able to deal more candidly with the factually obvious inequity in
school facilities caused by the local property tax system of school financing.
The majority would then have been forced to balance forthrightly the harm
to the educational process against the potential state interest under the fed-
eral system in local control over public schools. Having been allowed by the
model here suggested to make that full analysis, they would perhaps have
been more willing to entertain the plaintiffs' position, particularly because
they would not have been required arbitrarily to raise education to the level
of a fundamental right for all future cases in order to decide for the plaintiffs
in the instant case. Instead, the majority was caught in the unenviable posi-
tion of having to admit the real harm of the Texas system, while feeling com-
pelled to advocate in purely legalistic terms a complete judicial hands-off
position.
Marshall's suggested nexus formula for determining fundamentalness could
also be applied to other areas of recent Court interest. In fact, Justice Bren-
nan implicitly used a similar form of analysis in Shapiro v. Thompsono1 in
finding that the right to travel was fundamental. Moreover, the right of
privacy and its close nexus with the Constitution appeared, as Justice Mar-
shall has noted, 2 to lie behind the Court's equal protection analysis in Eisen-
tion and the right to vote or speak]." Id. at 36. Instead, he argued that the only constitu-
tionally protected rights are the absolute right to vote or to speak, rather than the rights
to "effective speech or the most informed electoral choice." Id. at 36. One can certainly
wonder whether that statement represents anything more than a legalistic distinction
without a true difference, especially in light of the reasoning of the Supreme Court
throughout the due process and criminal procedure areas where the right to a meaningful
hearing or a fair trial are the focal point of the Courtls analyses. See, e.g., Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-69 (1970).
There can be little doubt that under Justice Marshall's spectrum approach those very
nexus propositions raised by the appellees, and conceded by Justice Powell, would have
raised the right to education to a level of fundamentalness deserving the Court's closer
scrutiny.
59. 383 U.S. at 667.
60. See 411 U.S. at 111-15. Justice Marshall in his dissent in Rodriguez fully dis-
cussed education's close ties to the first amendment freedoms and the right to vote as
establishing the basis for evaluating education's fundamentalness.
61. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Justice Brennan, without attempting to tie the right to
travel to any explicit clause in the Constitution, found the right implicit in the overall
intent of the drafters of the Constitution to form a federal union. Id. at 630. See also
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (right to privacy found implicit in
first amendment).
62. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 103-04 (1973)
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stadt v. Baird.63
However, the question still remains how the Court can logically and with
congruity weigh the other side of any balancing formula, the state interest.
Even if we suggest to the Court a framework for evaluating both suspectness
and fundamentalness when they are either individually or jointly present, is
it not also necessary to suggest a framework within which the Court can con-
sistently weigh the value given the state interest?
C. Weighing the State Interest
The answer need not be an obvious yes, because in practice, particularly
in the area of procedural due process and in the first amendment cases, the
Court already pursues the type of weighing suggested here in the absence of
any rigid framework for analysis. 64  Perhaps such cases can serve as the
logical starting point for evaluating those areas in which the Court has most
consistently found the state interest to be significant.
In the areas of procedural due process and first amendment rights, the
trend has been to value the state's police powers as most deserving of judicial
deference. These powers have often been referred to as the means of pre-
serving public health, safety and welfare. In the case of first amendment
freedoms, generally the highest level of state interest must be shown to justify
abridgement of the freedom of speech. The test historically used by the
Court was the "clear and present danger" test.65 However, where procedural
due process rights were at issue, the Court could either find the state's finan-
cial interest a "rational" and sufficient reason for the infringement,66 or find
it simply irrelevant. 67
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall went on to state, "Mhis Court has con-
sistently adjusted the care with which it will review state discrimination in light of the
constitutional significance of the interests affected and the invidiousness of the particu-
lar classification." Id. at 109.
63. Justice Brennan, writing the plurality opinion in Eisenstadt, stated:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the mari-
tal relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
405 U.S. at 453.
64. See cases cited note 45 supra.
65. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
66. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). This case involved a bank-
rupt's filing fee and illustrates the often close tie between equal protection and due
process analysis.
67. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971). Mayer involved the right of a
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In the area of equal protection, several cases serve to illustrate the poten-
tial tie between a state's police power and a finding of a nearly or actually
compelling state interest. In Korematsu v. United States 8 the Court found
a compelling state interest reasonably pursued, pointing to the fear of public
disturbance and sabotage, and the nature of the federal government's war
powers. Similarly, the public's general welfare, as reflected in the "environ-
ment" of their village, was also raised to a substantial level of judicial defer-
ence in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas69 where the Court upheld a local
zoning ordinance as clearly within the state's police powers. In comparison,
even though the Court found that neither a suspect class nor a fundamental
right was at issue in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,' °
the state's financial interest, as distinct from its police powers, was never-
theless found insufficient to sustain the legislation in the face of an equal pro-
tection challenge. Although such a pattern may be sketchy at best, the Court
has been willing to weigh openly the state interest in several areas and has
generally found it most substantial where the public's health or safety was
the most directly affected.
Therefore, a test for active enforcement of the equal protection clause
would logically call for an evaluation of all legislation which affects a classi-
fication with suspect qualities or a right possessing indicia of fundamental-
ness. Such a model would then necessitate a judicial balancing of the state
interest in the exercise of its police power against the suspectness of the classi-
fication drawn and the fundamentalness of the rights infringed. Although
the Court clearly has not yet advocated this type of comprehensive model
for the review of all equal protection cases, there are telling indications that
the Court is going to use equal protection analysis in a far less rigid and far
more comprehensive way than in the past.
misdemeanor defendant to have access to an adequate transcript on appeal. The right
was granted by statute to all felony defendants. The Court, in finding the distinction be-
tween misdemeanor and felony defendants an unreasoned distinction in light of the
fourteenth amendment, failed even to address the state's financial interest in the distinc-
tion. id.
68. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court here found the extenuating circumstances of
World War II sufficiently "compelling" at the time to justify exclusion of all persons
of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast.
69. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
70. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In Moreno, the class discriminated against included house-
holds with unrelated members and the right denied was the right to receive food stamp
payments from the federal treasury. The Government based its position on the financial
stake it held in preventing abuse of the system, but the Court independently evaluated
that contention and found it without sufficient basis to support the discrimination. Id.
at 533-38.
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V. WHERE THE COURT STANDS Now
During the last two full terms the Supreme Court has clearly broken with
the two-tier test of the Warren Era, 71 yet no alternative model has been
articulated. The Burger Court's equal protection decisions can be divided
into six broad classes: 1) those in which the old rational basis test has been
adhered to; 2) those in which the Warren Court's version of strict scrutiny
has been applied; 3) those in which a new, toughened rational basis test has
been alluded to; 4) those in which strict scrutiny would have apparently been
called for, but where the results fail to follow the "fatal in fact" scenario of
the Warren Court; 5) those in which due process analysis was used, but need
not have been given a more flexible equal protection standard; and 6) those
in which some form of judicial balancing was overtly present.
An attempt will be made here to look at how each class of cases either
does or does not lend support for a new balancing test. Note will also be
taken of the types of cases the Court has chosen to place into each category
in order to determine what factors the Court might ultimately choose to rest
its decisions upon if an overt balancing analysis were adopted.
A. Rational Basis Test
The Court has adhered to the pure application of the rational basis test
only where it has either been faced with economic regulation7 2 or where no
direct suggestion of suspectness or fundamentalness was present. This trend
did not exist even two terms earlier when the rights of illegitimates 73 and free-
dom from incarceration7 4 were considered as undeserving of even minimal
scrutiny. Although there is arguably one exception, 7 the more recent posi-
71. See commentaries cited notes 18 & 19 supra.
72. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (statute sus-
tained which discriminated between corporations and individuals with respect to ad
valorem taxes on personalty); North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug
Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973) (statute under which only registered pharmacists or
corporations whose majority ownership was in the hands of practicing registered pharma-
cist could operate drug stores in South Dakota upheld, as in Williamson v. Lee Optical
Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)). Compare id. with City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 501 F.2d
706 (5th Cir. 1974), postponing the question of juris. to hearing on merits, 43 U.S.L.W.
3545 (U.S. April 14, 1975) (Fifth Circuit failed to find new vendors had fundamental
right to sell hot dogs from a push cart in the Vieux Carre in New Orleans, but never-
theless struck down a "grandfather clause" which allowed only vendors who had been
in operation for eight years to do so).
73. See Labihe v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
74. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
75. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The ap-
pellees in this case argued that wealth was a suspect classification and education a funda-
mental right.
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tion of the Court has been to use the purely deferential rational basis test
only in cases where a classification was made which was clearly outside the
traditional characteristics of a suspect class. 76 In this sense the Court has
conformed to a balancing approach in that the least scrutiny has been applied
where the least suggestion of suspectness exists. The variable in this formula,
which may explain the one exception, is that where the state interest is
viewed by the Court as very substantial, then even though a suggestion of
fundamentalness or suspectness can be made, the Court will still employ only
minimal scrutiny. 77
B. Strict Scrutiny
It is possible that the only classifications for which the Court in the future
will apply truly strict scrutiny are race, nationality, and alienage. 78 The rea-
son may well be the Court's reticence to unnecessarily tie its hands in dealing
with such potentially controversial topics as sex and wealth discrimination.
But not only has the expansion of the "suspect class" category been
stopped, 79 the entire fundamental interest category has slipped into a new,
more variable standard of review. The Court's new treatment of fundamental
interest cases can be viewed as the vanguard for the more flexible standard
of review suggested above.
C. A Toughened Rational Basis Standard of Review
The Burger Court was first seen breaking with the Warren Court's two-
tier model within the traditional language of the rational relationship test.80
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 ' Justice Brennan, writing the plurality opinion with
Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Stewart, used language of the rational rela-
tionship test in holding that the equal protection clause denies " 'to States the
power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by
76. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (conscientious objectors de-
nied veterans' benefits).
77. The desire on the part of a state to maintain maximum control over its educa-
tional system may account for the Court's use of the rational basis test here despite the
appellees' arguments of fundamentalness and suspectness. The tradition of localized
control of education in America is longstanding and may have been at the root of the
Court's use of the deferential rational basis standard.
78. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
79. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (mentally ill persons not sus-
pect class); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (sex not suspect class); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimates not suspect class).
80. See Gunther.
81. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of that statute.' "82 Yet, by being careful to pick goals that were
not so related and omitting goals that potentially were, s8 Justice Brennan was
able to strike down the statute as lacking a rational goal which he was willing
to postulate. Of course, this narrow type of goal evaluation was at variance
with the traditional "any conceivable basis" test.8 4
The toughened tier one standard of review was striking and set a new tone
which the Court has followed with some consistency where the rights denied
could arguably be regarded as fundamental.8 5 By its willingness to question
a state's factual assumptions, as the Eisenstadt plurality had done,8 the
Court has since found invalid a state statute for commitment of the men-
tally ill.87 In its most clear break with the past, the Court in United States
Department of Agriculture v. Morenos" elevated welfare benefits to a new
semiprotected status by striking down a clearly nonsuspect classification
which deprived certain citizens of the right to food stamps.8 9
This trend implicitly extended the areas of suspectness as well. Three
statutes affecting illegitimates were struck down through the use of a tough-
ened tier one analysis, though no suspect class or strict scrutiny language was
used.9 0 Sex classifications were similarly denied suspect status, but were
82. Id. at 447, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (emphasis added).
83. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J.
123 (1972); discussion of this issue note 30 supra.
84. See cases cited note 10 supra.
85. In only one previous case had the Court hinted at this type of "narrow ends scru-
tiny" under the rational basis test. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
86. See 405 U.S. at 447-54.
87. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
88. 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (food stamps were denied households containing unrelated
members).
89. See discussion of Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974), note 125
infra; Dorrough v. Estelle, 497 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1974) (court applied tough-
ened rational basis test to strike down Texas statute providing for dismissal of
defendant's direct appeal from state felony conviction upon escape from confinement
and failure to return voluntarily within ten days).
90. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (de-
nial of welfare benefits to households with illegitimate children was found violative of
equal protection clause); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (work-
men's compensation law which gave priority to legitimate heirs found violative of equal
protection clause as bearing no significant relationship to statutory purpose); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (statute which failed to provide for hearing at which
fathers of illegitimate children would have opportunity to prove their fitness to have cus-
tody upon mother's death found violative of equal protection clause).
A subtle shift of language was employed in Weber, where the right of unacknowledged
illegitimates to recover workmen's compensation benefits was at issue. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, appeared to modify the traditional "rational relationship" lan-
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nevertheless closely scrutinized when made the basis for determining which
military personnel would automatically receive dependency benefits and
which would have to substantiate their eligibility.91 Thus, by its selective use
of a toughened tier one analysis, the Court has suggested new areas of both
suspectness and fundamentalness without having to expressly declare their
existence.
D. The Concurrent Expansion and Easing of
Tier Two Strict Scrutiny
If some cases were now to be given more careful scrutiny under tier one
analysis, the Court was also to scrutinize less severely certain tier two cases.
This trend was most clearly evident in the area of "fundamental" rights. Far
from applying the almost absolute scrutiny thought to exist in this area,92 the
Court has shown a growing willingness to adopt a variable standard of review
in fundamental rights cases to fit the particular facts before it.
For example, in the area of legislative reapportionment where the funda-
mental right to vote is at issue, the Court has shown a new willingness to
evaluate the facts of each case and a reticence to allow the mere categoriza-
tion of the rights involved to determine completely the outcome. In
Reynold v. Sims,9 3 the right to vote in the reapportionment context had
clearly been held to be fundamental and deserving of strict scrutiny when
guage of the tier one test to a requirement that a "significant relationship" between the
classification and the state interest be shown. 406 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added). It
is of course noteworthy that this shift of language occurred in a case involving a classifi-
cation which possessed many of the indicia of suspectness, and in an opinion which six
justices chose to join.
91. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Although only a plurality
of the Court found that classifications drawn on the basis of sex were inherently suspect,
a majority of the Court agreed that requiring female, and not male members of the mili-
tary to prove a spouse's dependency was a violation of the equal protection guarantee
found in the fifth amendment.
Similarly, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), Chief Justice Burger, writing for a
unanimous Court, found the automatic preference of males over females in the appoint-
ment of administrators to estates without a rational basis despite his admission that
such a procedure reduced the workload of probate courts. Id. at 76.
On the other hand, in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), a majority of the
Court refused to find that the exclusion of pregnancy from an otherwise comprehensive
state workmen's insurance program involved sex discrimination. Justice Brennan dis-
sented strongly, arguing that a sex classification was present and that the stricter stand-
ard of Frontiero and Reed should thus apply. Id. at 503.
92. Such truly strict scrutiny still does exist in the case of certain suspect classes.
See p. 575 supra.
93. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). "Like Skinner v. Oklahoma. . . . [this] case 'touches a
sensitive and important area of human rights,' and 'involves one of the basic civil rights
of man....'" Id. at 561.
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Justice Warren, speaking for the majority, analogized it to the right of pro-
creation at issue in Skinner v. Oklahoma9 4 and also traced the constitutional
roots for judicial control over apportionment.95  Later, however, in Swann
v. Adams 6 it was not as clear that "strict scrutiny" was invoked, despite the
fact that the state legislature's apportionment scheme again was struck down.
The Court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that in Reynolds the door had
been left open to the state where "variations from a pure population standard
might be justified by such state policy considerations as the integrity of politi-
cal subdivisions, the maintenance of compactness and contiguity in legisla-
tive districts or the recognition of natural or historical boundary lines."'' 7
This is hardly a list of considerations that would meet the traditional com-
pelling state interest test. Then, only last term, the Court was willing in
both White v. Regester 8 and Gaffney v. Cummings9 to allow state appor-
tionment plans to stand where the deviation between districts was deemed by
the Court so slight as not to raise even a prima facie equal protection claim.
By the use of this seemingly unique means of avoidance the Court did not
have to face the issue of when a fundamental right can be infringed, how-
ever slightly, without the showing of a compelling state interest. Essentially
the Court's position was that no infringement at all had occurred. However,
left unanswered is the question of how the Court would deal with this type
of "minor" infringement, if it in fact recognized it as such. Since the Court
has only recognized an all or nothing standard for determining if a funda-
mental right exists and has applied a virtually fatal-in-fact test when such
a right is found, it appears analytically impossible for the Court to deal di-
rectly with either a "minor" infringement of a fundamental right or a more
serious infringement of rights not previously deemed fundamental but pos-
sessing many of the indicia of fundamentalness. The Court in both Gaffney
and White was simply forced to avoid the issue because no adequate test as
yet exists.
Another interesting example of the Court's dilemma in the area of funda-
mental rights is O'Brien v. Skinner,100 where convicted misdemeanants and
pretrial detainees confined in their home counties were denied the oppor-
tunity to register and vote. Justice Burger, writing for the majority, refused
to expressly raise the cause of action to one involving a fundamental right,
94. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
95. See 377 U.S. at 561-68.
96. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
97. Id. at 444.
98. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
99. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
100. 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
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yet found the state action so "wholly arbitrary" as to be a violation of the
equal protection clause. 1 1 Justice Marshall, with Justices Douglas and
Brennan, voiced concurrence in the result, but a lack of understanding as to
why the case did not turn on the infringement of a fundamental right and
thus call for invocation of the compelling state interest test.10 2
Therefore, while not explicitly adopting a variable standard for weighing
fundamentalness, the suggestion is apparent that the absolute categorization
of rights may no longer be adequate to deal with the broad range of equal
protection issues before the Court. As in Gaffney, White and O'Brien, the
issue of whether or not a fundamental right has in fact been infringed may
often simply have to be avoided by the Court until a more adequate test
is adopted. The curious result reached in O'Brien, at least under traditional
notions of equal protection as practiced by the Warren Court, of having a
state action struck down while nominally using traditional tier one language,
evidences the shift in analysis. It is also significant that this occurred in a
case where three Justices felt a "fundamental" right was at issue.
E. A Thin Line Between Equal Protection and
Procedural Due Process
In several recent cases the line between equal protection and due process
issues has become blurred. The result has been an interesting group of po-
tential equal protection cases which have been overtly handled by due process
balancing and which therefore never required the Court to make a determi-
nation of whether tier one or tier two equal protection analysis was appropri-
ate. It is in -this grey area that the unnecessary and unsatisfactory qualities
of the two-tier equal protection structure are most apparent. In Boddie v.
Connecticut'03 a filing fee required for all divorce actions was at issue. The
case raised both due process and equal protection questions, i.e., the general
right of access to the courts and 'the right of the poor as a class to change
their fundamental marriage relationships. However, Justice Harlan, writing
for the majority, chose to view the case from a due process perspective and
was thus able to weigh all the relevant facts, including the nature of
the class discriminated against and the right infringed upon, before arriving
at his decision to strike down the filing fee requirement. In so doing he il-
101. Id. at 530.
102. Id. at 533-34 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
103. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Both Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, in separate
concurring opinions, argued that the case should be decided under the equal protection
clause, rather than the due process clause used by Justice Harlan in writing for the ma-
jority. Id. at 383, 386 (Douglas & Brennan, JJ., concurring in part).
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lustrated the practicality of using the same balancing method of analysis to
deal with both due process and equal protection issues.
Another interesting illustration of the convergence of the two issues is
found in the companion cases of United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno'0 4 and United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,'0° both
of which dealt with provisions of the Food Stamp Act of 1964.106 The Court
chose to characterize Moreno as an equal protection case by viewing the
"household" qualification involved as absolute, while in Murry the Court
viewed a tax dependency qualification as somehow less absolute and there-
fore more susceptible to a due process cure. Although technically there may
be some basis for the distinction, Justice Marshall was quick to identify
the essential convergence of due process and equal protection issues in both
cases by noting the overt and distinct classifications involved in each case. 107
He might also have pointed out that the spectrum approach he had suggested
in Rodriguez, 08 if carried to its logical conclusion, would have made any dis-
tinction between equal protection and due process issues unnecessary.
Finally, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has acknowledged im-
plicitly the convergence of equal protection and due process issues in certain
fact patterns by adopting a new irrebutable presumption test.100 The test
is inherently one of due process balancing and can be applied when the Court
finds a legislative enactment which presupposes that if one is in a certain
class, then a particular result must follow. By utilization of this approach
the Court implies that a more adequate hearing process would provide an
adequate remedy. Though this may not be true in many of the traditional
areas of equal protection interest, it is the case generally where equal protec-
tion and due process issues converge. The most notable advantage of the
irrebutable presumption approach flows from the overt balancing implicit in
its due process origins. If, however, the balancing model proposed here for
equal protection cases were adopted, this advantage would disappear. This
very position was adopted by Justice White in disagreeing with the irrebuttable
presumption analysis of the majority in Vlandis v. Kline:110
From these and other cases, such as Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v.
104. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
105. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
106. 7 U.S.C. § 2011-25 (1970).
107. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 517-19 (1973)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
108. 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. See Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer
Equal Protection, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 217 (1975).
110. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); and Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), it is clear that we employ not just
one, or two, but, as my Brother MARSHALL has so ably demon-
strated a 'spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination al-
legedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.' San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting) . . . for [as] must now be obvious, or has
been all along ... as the Court's assessment of the weight and value
of the individual interest escalates, the less likely it is that mere ad-
ministrative convenience and avoidance of hearings or investigations
will be sufficient to justify what otherwise would appear to be ir-
rational discriminations.
Here, it is enough for me that the interest involved is that of ob-
taining a higher education, that the difference between in-state and
out-of-state tuition is substantial, and that the State, without suffi-
cient justification, imposes a one-year residency requirement on
some students but not on others, and also refuses, no matter what
the circumstances, to permit the requirement to be satisfied through
bona fide residence while in school. It is plain enough that the
State has only the most attenuated interest in terms of administra-
tive convenience in maintaining this bizarre pattern of discrimina-
,tion among those who must or must not pay a substantial tuition to
the University. The discrimination imposed by the State is invidi-
ous and violates the Equal Protection Clause."'
F. The Balancing of Some Equal Protection Cases
Particularly where a classification tends to restrict the fundamental rights
of a class, the Burger Court has in many instances expressly balanced the
individual harm against the state interest. Although even the strictures of
the Warren Court model would have allowed this type of balancing for tier
two cases, the initial question was always on to which tier the case fell.
Thus, in the area of fundamental rights the Warren Court's initial determina-
tion was simply whether the right was indeed fundamental 112 or not." 3 Only
111. Id. at 458-59 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Note should also be
taken of the vacillation between due process and equal protection analysis in Justice
Stewart's majority opinion in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Le Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974),
where pregnant teachers were required to take extended leave. After characterizing Le
Fleur as an irrebutable presumption case, Stewart laid out the standard due process test
as being "whether the interests advanced in support of the rules of the . . . School
Boards can justify the particular procedures they have adopted." Id. at 640. However,
he then switched to the traditional language of tier one equal protection analysis in stat-
ing, "We thus conclude that the arbitrary cutoff dates embodied in the mandatory leave
rules before us have no rational relationship to the valid state interest of preserving the
continuity of instruction." Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
112. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel).
113. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing).
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if the right were deemed fundamental would the state interest have to be
weighed to ascertain if it were compelling. In other words, for the Warren
Court the fundamental right side of the formula was an in-or-out test and
it was actually only the state interest that was weighed. However, the Burger
Court began implicitly, as Justice White pointed out, 1 4 to weigh both ends
of the scale. Thus, even where the clearly fundamental right to travel was
at issue, it could be assigned one weight where it arose in the context of indi-
gent medical care," 5 and another when the context was voter registration.'1 6
Similarly, if the classification affected the right to vote, the nature of the fran-
chise involved would be reflected in the value of the state interest required
to justify it. When the right to vote in a water district election was at issue,
the Court expressly assigned the fundamental right to vote a low value and
was willing to accept the state's allegations of fact almost without question.' 1 7
Yet, when a candidate's filing fee in a primary would effect voter choices
in a general election, the Court's stance shifted." 8  Thus, Justice Burger,
writing for the majority in Lubin v. Parish, spoke of a more substantial form
of scrutiny and even discussed the balancing of interests on both sides of the
scale though never overtly invoking the language of the Warren Court's tier
two compelling state interest test. Justice Burger noted the standard of re-
view he thought should apply in stating:
This legitimate state interest [in limiting the length of the ballot],
however, must be achieved by a means that does not unfairly or
unnecessarily burden either a minority party's or an individual can-
didate's equally important interest in the continued availability of
114. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (White, J., concurring).
115. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). See also
Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171, 1179 (4th Cir. 1974) (right to travel seen as depend-
iag on circumstances; state interest in controlling admission to bar was sufficient to jus-
tify classification as to residents of reciprocal and nonreciprocal states when granting
automatic admission to South Carolina bar).
116. See Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679
(1973). Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
117. See Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410
U.S. 743 (1973); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719 (1973).
118. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974). Compare Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134 (1972) with Bell v. Hongisto, 501 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1974), where the court
noted:
In equal protection cases, the burden of justification that must be carried by
the state is sometimes heavy and sometimes light, depending on the nature of
the classification in question and the nature of the imposition which the state
law places upon the encumbered class.
Id. at 353. However, since the court ruled that the right to appeal a contempt citation
was not fundamental, and, even if fundamental, was not sufficiently infringed in the case
at bar, it declined to find an equal protection violation.
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political opportunity. The interests involved are not merely those
of parties or individual candidates; the voters can assert their pref-
erences only through candidates or parties or both and it is this
broad interest that must be weighed in the balance. 119
The Court's growing willingness to weigh both sides of the now shifting
two-tier model has also become apparent where potentially suspect classifica-
tions must be evaluated. In Reed v. Reed120 the Court found that there was
a rational relationship between a sex classification and the valid state goal
of increasing probate efficiency, but, for an unarticulated reason, still did not
find the state interest sufficient to sustain the legislation. Though failing to
agree that the classification was "suspect," the Court noted the need to ac-
complish a legitimate state interest in a "manner consistent with the com-
mand of the Equal Protection Clause.' 12 1 Thus, the Court had clearly been
caught by a case where agreement could not be reached that the classification
was invidious enough to be characterized as "suspect" but where the majority
was also unwilling to subject the classification to only the minimal scrutiny
of the rational basis test. The result was an ambiguous opinion that implied
judicial balancing could occur on tier one of traditional equal protection
analysis, where it had never been previously acknowledged to exist.
Similarly, the Court used a balancing form of analysis in a series of cases
in which the rights of illegitimate children were at issue. Although illegiti-
mates may be viewed historically as possessing many of the same indicia of
suspectness that one would associate with other classifications which have
been deemed by the Court to create "discrete and insular minorities"' 122 they
have never been officially elevated to the position of a "suspect" class with
the accompanying protection of the compelling state interest test. However,
beginning with Levy v. Louisiana,'23 the Warren Court accorded illegitimates
119. 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 43 U.S.L.W. 4449,
4452 (U.S. April 15, 1975) (where the Court recently struck down a statutory distinc-
tion between the sexes by stating, "under any test---compelling state interest, or rational
basis or something in between- . [this statute] does not survive an equal protection
attack." (emphasis added)).
120. 404U.S. 71 (1971).
121. Id. at 76 (emphasis added). For a toughened tier one approach to sex classifi-
cations, see Brenden v. Indep. School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (court struck
down rule barring females from participating with males in high school interscholastic
athletics). See also Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264
(9th Cir. 1974) (court applied "strict rationality" test to strike down use of higher ad-
mission standards for females than males).
122. Under the criteria for determining suspectness as outlined in the text accom-
panying note 45 supra, illegitimate children have certainly suffered stigmatization be-
cause of a characteristic which is immutable.
123. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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a special position. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, characterized the
rights involved as flowing from the "intimate, familial relationship between
a child and his mother."'124 Thus, after expressly stating that the traditional
tier one rational relationship test would be applied, 12 1 Justice Douglas im-
mediately qualified his position by stating that, in fact, the Court has applied
this test differently depending upon whether basic civil rights were affected
or whether the classification was one affecting only the economic sector.
Having drawn this heretofore unrecognized distinction under traditional tier
one analysis, he then found the classification between legitimate children and
illegitimate children under the Louisiana wrongful death statute without any
rational basis. 126
Yet, in Labine v. Vincent127 the Burger Court found this same classifica-
tion between legitimate children and illegitimate children permissible under
the Louisiana intestate succession statute. This apparent contradiction was
explained by Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 28 when he expressly admitted that judicial balancing
had occurred in the equal protection area. Justice Powell took the position
that the majority opinion in Labine reflected the importance which the Court
had attached to the state's regulation of property disposition within its
borders.129 In contrast, he suggested that the state interest in the workmen's
compensation statute involved -in Weber was more analogous to the wrongful
death statute which had been at issue in Levy.' 30 Having drawn this distinc-
tion between state interests, Justice Powell struck down the classification be-
tween legitimate children and illegitimate children under the workmen's com-
pensation statute. In so holding, he put forward a new method of judicial
scrutiny which strongly suggested a balancing model: "The essential inquiry
in all the foregoing cases is . . . inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state
interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights
124. Id. at 71.
125. Justice Douglas stated, "Though the test has been variously stated, the end result
is whether the line drawn is a rational one." Id.
See Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1974), where the court held that an
Atlanta ordinance which enabled city water works to terminate tenant service when the
landlord is delinquent failed the "traditional 'rational basis' test."
126. 391 U.S. at 72. Justice Douglas stated, "Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has
no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother."
127. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
128. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
129. Id. at 170. Justice Powell stated, "That [Labine] decision reflected, in major
part, the traditional deference to a State's prerogative to regulate the disposition at death
of property within its borders." Id.
130. Id. at 171-72.
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might the classification endanger?" 13' Then in the final sentence of the opin-
ion, without ever having asserted that illegitimacy created a "suspect class,"
Justice Powell stated, "[T]he Equal Protection Clause does enable us to
strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where .. .the
classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or other-
wise."113 2
Therefore, just as in the cases noted previously, where the right to vote
or a sex classification was at issue, 33 the Court has again independently
evaluated both the legislative means and ends in applying what is essentially
a balancing test.
VI. JUSTICE MARSHALL SUGGESTS A NEW APPROACH
Justice Marshall can be credited as the first Supreme Court Justice to ex-
press recognition of the need for a new framework within which the Court
could more honestly deal with equal protection questions. In his now famous
dissents in Dandridge v. Williams 3 4 and San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,135 his view on the need for a spectrum approach in
dealing with equal protection issues was presented. He argued that the
Warren Court two-tier model simply failed to deal adequately with the
variety and complexity of the issues now before the Court in the area of equal
protection. The model that had once seemed the tool of an activist Court
was now in effect stunting judicial growth in this area.
The specific model he would suggest was not at first clear, but at the least
it called for a determination of relative fundamentalness136 and suspectness1 37
rather than the seemingly more simplistic aye or nay determinations used pre-
viously. He advocated varying standards of scrutiny and the weighing of
state interests. In referring to his earlier opinion in Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosely,' 38 he stated, "We must consider the substantiality of the
state interests sought to be served, and we must scrutinize the reasonableness
of the means by which the State has sought to advance its interests."'1 39 Jus-
tice Marshall also suggested the need for candor in developing a new equal
protection model, pointing out that in several past decisions "this Court has
131. Id. at 173.
132. Id. at 176.
133. See pp. 582-83 supra.
134. 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970).
135. 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973).
136. See id. at 110-17.
137. See id. at 104-10.
138. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
139. 411 U.S. at 124 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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consistently adjusted the care with which it will review state discrimination
in light of the constitutional significance of the interests affected and the in-
vidiousness of the particular classification.' 140
Later, in Marshall v. United States,14' which dealt with a federal law auto-
matically excluding felons with two prior convictions from gaining access to
a special drug rehabilitation program, Justice Marshall again dissented 142 and
renewed his objections to the Court's inflexible approach to equal protection.
The case did not fit into the previously mentioned neat categories of a suspect
class or a fundamental right, but, as Marshall noted, neither were the issues
similar to those in a case involving the sale of eyeglasses 143 or the right to
own a pharmacy.144  Here, in contrast, a vivid and substantial harm was in-
volved in the denial of narcotics treatment, and apparently no remedy was
available under traditional equal protection analysis.
As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Richardson v. Ramirez,145
Compelling state interest is merely a shorthand description of the
difficult process of balancing individual and state interests that the
Court must embark upon when faced with a classification touching
on fundamental rights.' 46
Perhaps that same form of judicial balancing has already begun to occur
on what is traditionally assumed to be the purely deferential first tier of
equal protection analysis and the Court's frank admission of that develop-
ment will avoid some of the inconsistencies Justice Marshall has so aptly
criticized.
VII. CONCLUSION
As Justice Marshall noted,1 47 balancing is not new to equal protection
analysis. In fact, a restricted example of balancing has always occurred on
the second tier of the Warren Court model. The difference suggested here,
140. Id. at 109. Justice Marshall cited Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972), Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968), in support of this position.
141. 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
142. Id. at 430.
143. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See
also Goldstein v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1974) (court gratuitously
noted that there is no fundamental right to garbage collection).
144. See North Dakota St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S.
156 (1973).
145. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
146. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
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and supported by Justice Marshall, 148 is that not only the state interest but
also the actual harm of the legislation should be weighed in a flexible man-
ner. The state interest would be viewed as the potential benefit of the legis-
lation and would present an area within which the Court has shown itself
able ,to make weighing evaluations in the past. Conversely, the classification
affected and the rights infringed would be evaluated as the potential harm
of the legislation and would present a newer area for judicial weighing.
However, given criteria of suspectness (such as the discrete and insular na-
ture of the minority, the stigmatization involved, and the immutability of the
trait), a reasonable judicial evaluation of the harm from the classifica-
tion itself could be made. Also, by evaluating the nexus between the right
infringed and the Constitution, the Court could make an equally reasonable
evaluation of the harm stemming from that infringement. Only after
having used both the criteria suggested for evaluating the legislation's poten-
tial harm and the criteria suggested for determining the benefit of the state
interest promoted would the Court ,be in a position to make a candid deci-
sion as to whether a given equal protection challenge should be sustained.
Further, by consistently engaging in the balancing form of analysis the Court
would itself create a more complete set of judicial decisionmaking criteria
which could, in turn, be used by legislators, practitioners and the public as a
coherent basis for determining whether or not to challenge a particular legis-
lative enactment. Only by adopting this more open system can both the par-
ties' expectations and judicial candor be preserved.
Craig M. McCabe
148. See pp. 585-86 supra. Justice Marshall is not necessarily alone on the Court in
advocating a balancing model. He was joined in his dissent in Dandridge by Justice
Brennan and in his dissent in Rodriguez by Justice Douglas. Further, Justice White advo-
cated a similar position in his dissent in Vlandis and Chief Justice Burger implicitly ac-
cepted a balancing approach in Labine. Also, a majority of the Court joined Justice
Powell in advocating a new approach in Weber, and the majority appeared to apply a
balancing model in Moreno.
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